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The concept of ‘adverse human rights impacts’ introduced by the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is frequently used in 
institutional, activist and scholarly discourse. However, the term is under-
explored and usually equated with ‘human rights violation’, occluding its 
transformative potential. This article demonstrates its expansiveness and 
rationale: ‘impacts’ cover any business act which removes or reduces an 
individual’s enjoyment of human rights. The formula is designed to 
capture business acts that are not paradigmatically understood as human 
rights violations but that nonetheless cause harmful outcomes. This can 
encompass, inter alia, acts which reduce market access to essential goods, 
harm caused by business-related tax abuse, and business contributions to 
climate change. The extra-legal concept provides an authoritative 
argumentative framework through which social understandings of 
business-related harm can evolve and can underlie a transformative shift 
in the business-society relationship.  
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The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.
1
 They 
implement the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework designed by John 
Ruggie in 2008, under which states have a duty to protect human rights, 
corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights, and both 
parties have differentiated responsibilities to provide access to a remedy in 
case of breach.
2
 They have since been incorporated into various 
international and domestic instruments and are described as having 
‘definitively changed the lingua franca’ of business and human rights 
(BHR).
3
 The UNGPs introduce the concept of ‘human rights impacts’ in 
Principle 13, which Ruggie describes as ‘the central Guiding Principle 
regarding the corporate responsibility to respect human rights’.
4
 
Businesses are responsible for those adverse impacts they cause, 
contribute to, or are ‘directly linked to… by their business relationships’.
 5 
Firms should also proactively investigate their own impacts through a 
process of human rights due diligence (HRDD).
6
   
This article investigates the definition and scope of ‘human rights 
impacts’. As McCorquodale and others argue, ‘impacts’ have been 
understood as synonymous with violations, in practice largely limiting the 
scope to legal and regulatory infractions.
7
 This is a narrow and prima facie 
incorrect interpretation of the term that negates its transformative 
potential. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) guidance on the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights defines the term as follows: ‘[a]n “adverse human rights impact” 
occurs when an action removes or reduces the ability of an individual to 
                                           
1 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04. 
2 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (2008) A/HRC/8/5. 
3 Surya Deva, ‘Business and Human Rights: Time to Move Beyond the Beginning’ in Cesar 
Rodriguez Garavito (eds), Business and Human Rights (CUP 2017) 62. 
4 John Ruggie, ‘Comments on Thun Group of Banks: Discussion Paper on the 
Implications of UN Guiding Principles 13 & 17 in a Corporate and Investment Banking 
Context’ (2017) 
<https://www.ihrb.org/uploads/submissions/John_Ruggie_Comments_Thun_Banks_Feb_2
017.pdf> accessed 21 June 2019.  
5 ‘Guiding Principles’ (n 1) Principle 13 (a) and (b). 
6 ibid Principle 17. 
7 Robert McCorquodale and others, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence in Law and Practice: 
Good Practices and Challenges for Business Enterprises’ (2017) 2 Business and Human 
Rights Journal 195, 198. 
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enjoy his or her human rights.’
8
 To summarize, I argue that ‘impacts’ 
expands well beyond the scope of legal infractions to capture a much wider 
range of harms. Most importantly, it captures the harmful outcomes of 
non-violative, or legally-permitted, acts. Any business ‘act’ that impacts any 
‘individual’ is covered insofar as the act causes the outcome of a ‘removal 
or reduction’ in rights enjoyment. The notion of ‘reducing’ rights 
enjoyment is particularly important for socio-economic rights, where 
corporate acts may quantitatively reduce access to a right through legal and 
ostensibly legitimate business practices.  
One such example is provided by the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) 
on the right to housing.
9
 She reported in 2017 on the extensive harm 
caused by corporations through ‘the financialization of housing’, wherein 
housing is treated as a commodity and local communities are left at the 
whims of speculators and corporate landlords.
10
 A corporation investing in 
housing is not, by most definitions of the term, violating the human rights 
of individuals in that community. But, where they are furthering extreme 
price inflation, as occurs in Hong Kong and London,
11
  and targeting lower-
income individuals, as the investment company Blackstone is specifically 
accused of doing,
12
 they would appear to meet the definition of an adverse 
impact in that they are ‘reducing’ the ability of those individuals to enjoy 
the right to housing. In legal terms, they are retrogressing the ‘affordability’ 
criterion of the right to housing.
13
 There is an evident trend towards using 
the ‘impacts’ framework to capture a wider range of business harms, 
                                           
8 OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights - An Interpretative 
Guide’ (2012) HR/PUB/12/02 5. 
9 UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, ‘The 
Financialization of Housing’ (2017) A/HRC/34/51.  
10 ibid [27].  
11 ibid [26]. 
12 Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on adequate 
housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to 
non-discrimination in this context, ‘Letter to the Blackstone Group’ (2019) OL OTH 
17/2019 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Financialization/OL_OTH_17_2019.
pdf> accessed 21 June 2019. 
13 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 
4: The Right to Adequate Housing’ (1991) E/C.12/1992/23 [8(c)]. 






 as well as tax avoidance
15
 and climate change.
16
 These 
arguments have however not fully elaborated the scope of ‘impacts’, and 
are vulnerable therefore to the claim that they are overreaching.
17
 The aim 
of this article is therefore to elaborate the scope of ‘impacts’, and thereby 
to solidify these arguments.   
‘Impacts’ should be read in light of Ruggie’s argument that ‘the 
business and human rights debate needs to expand beyond establishing 
individual corporate liability for wrongdoing [because] an individual 
liability model alone cannot fix the larger imbalances in the system of 
global governance.’
18
 The understanding of ‘impacts’ elaborated herein 
carries two major benefits. First, ‘impacts’ offers an expansive moral norm: 
corporations should not remove or reduce any individual’s rights by any 
means. The second benefit relates to the enforcement technique proffered 
in the UNGPs. Numerous corporate acts may ‘reduce’ some individuals’ 
rights enjoyment, including downsizing and increasing prices of essential 
goods. Not all such acts should be absolutely prohibited - ‘impacts’ as a 
hard legal standard would be unworkable. However, the UNGPs are 
grounded in ‘social norms’.
19
 As such, ‘impacts’ provides an authoritative 
argumentative framework through which social understandings of what 
constitutes harmful business impacts upon human rights can evolve.
20
  
Individuals in Hong Kong can turn the framework to their housing 
problems; those most suffering under climate change can use it to contest 
the adverse impacts suffered therein; as can those in states where human 
rights protection is weakened by tax abuse. As such, ‘impacts’ can help 
                                           
14 UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, ‘The 
Financialization of Housing’ (n 9) [62]-[66]. 
15 Shane Darcy, ‘The Elephant in the Room: Corporate Tax Avoidance & Business and 
Human Rights’ (2016) 2(1) Business and Human Rights Journal 23. 
16 Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, ‘Petition 
To the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines Requesting for Investigation of 
the Responsibility of the Carbon Majors for Human Rights Violations or Threats of 
Violations Resulting from the Impacts of Climate Change’ (2015) cited in Sara Seck, 
‘Revisiting Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries: Climate Justice, 
Feminism, and State Sovereignty’ (2016) 26 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 
383. 
17 David Scheffer, ‘The Ethical Imperative of Curbing Corporate Tax Avoidance’ (2013) 
27(4) Ethics & International Affairs 361, 365. 
18 John Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 
101(4) American Journal of International Law 819, 839. 
19 John Ruggie, ‘The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business & 
Human Rights’ (2017) HKS Working Paper No. RWP17-030, 15 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984901>. 
20 John Ruggie, ‘Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection’ in John 
Ruggie (ed), Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge (Routledge 2008) 232, 
232. 
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marshal arguments to contest business practices based on the ensuing 
human rights harm, while the framework can reflexively assist BHR in 
moving beyond what Wettstein terms ‘human rights minimalism’.
21
 
The article proceeds as follows: I first describe the importance of ‘strict 
responsibility’ for human rights impacts, and then discuss contemporary 
understandings, showing the prevalence of the idea that ‘impacts’ correlate 
to ‘violations’. I return to Ruggie’s background to better understand his 
priorities, and then deconstruct ‘impacts’ to demonstrate its wide scope. I 
discuss the role of impacts as an argumentative framework, and finally 
highlight the transformative potential of the term in capturing structural 
harm, power, and socio-economic justice, before concluding.  
2. Strict Responsibility for Human Rights 
Impacts 
To reiterate, ‘[a]n “adverse human rights impact” occurs when an action 
removes or reduces the ability of an individual to enjoy his or her human 
rights.’
22
 Businesses have a responsibility to prevent, mitigate and remedy 
those impacts which they cause or to which they contribute and they have 
a responsibility to use their leverage over third parties where they are 
‘linked to’ an impact by the business relationship.
23
 A 2017 debate in The 
European Journal of International Law clarified that corporations have 
‘strict responsibility’, akin to strict liability under tort law, for at least those 
impacts which they cause or to which they contribute.
 24
 The debate 
revolved around what Bonnitcha and McCorquodale argue are two 
different conceptions of HRDD evident in the UNGPs.
 
The first is as a 
process or method by which to understand and manage business risks, the 
second is as a standard of conduct, with the latter potentially exculpating 
the firm from responsibility. Under the process approach, HRDD is a tool 
designed to help businesses understand their risks, but correct application 
of HRDD does not provide a defence. Rather, the firm is ‘strictly 
responsible’ for all harm caused regardless of their HRDD practices. The 
                                           
21 Florian Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the 
Great Divide’ (2012) 22(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 739, 741-45. It must be noted that 
Wettstein alleges that the UNGPs are part of this minimalism, in part because reliance on 
‘respect’ ignores the ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ elements of human rights. 
22 OHCHR, ‘Responsibility to Respect’ (n 8) 5. 
23 Guiding Principles (n 1) Principle 13(a) and (b). 
24 Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert Mccorquodale, ‘The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2017) 28 European Journal of 
International Law 899, 912. 




standard of conduct approach has some equivalence to negligence under 
tort law, where if the firm can demonstrate that it has met the required 
standard of conduct for HRDD, it is not responsible for the harm caused 
on the grounds that it took adequate safeguarding measures. HRDD in 
this reading becomes a proxy for a meeting a common law duty of care.
25
 
The authors argue that this latter standard applies only to human rights 
impacts which are ‘linked to’ the firm, i.e. to which the company in 
question is not directly contributing.
26
 The conceptualization of HRDD as 
a risk management process applies to causal and contributory impacts. 
This does not function as a defence and therefore ‘[b]usinesses have a 
strict – or no fault – responsibility for their own adverse human rights 
impacts.’
27
 This therefore ‘establishes a clear line of accountability for 
remediation to victims under Guiding Principle 22’.
28
 Ruggie and 
Sherman, in reply, argue that this ‘falls short’ of the UNGPs.
29
 
Responsibility is contingent solely on the impact itself, suggesting that strict 
responsibility applies in all situations, with the distinction being that for 
linked harms leverage over the other actor should be used, rather than 
incurring direct remedial responsibility.
30
  
This means that for both Ruggie and Sherman, and Bonnitcha and 
McCorquodale, firms at least hold a no fault responsibility for any adverse 
impact which they cause or to which they contribute. Ruggie and Sherman 
suggest it extends to impacts which are ‘linked to’ the firm as well.
31
 
Bonnitcha and McCorquodale argue that this is an ethically correct 
standard because ‘[b]oth states and businesses are complex institutions. 
Notions of fault, which reflect ideas about the moral culpability of natural 
persons, are less relevant to harm caused by states and corporate actors.’
32
 
Bonnitcha and McCorquodale consider this statement only as an incentive 
to undertake meaningful HRDD, as per the scope of their argument.
33
 But 
perhaps more interesting is what this means for the term ‘impacts’. 
The notion of strict, no fault responsibility for adverse human rights 
impacts opens up the scope of impacts in ways which are particularly 
                                           
25 ibid 903. 
26 ibid 919. 
27 ibid 912. 
28 ibid 918. 
29 John Ruggie and John Sherman, ‘The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert 
McCorquodale’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 921, 922  
30  ibid 926-8; Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert Mccorquodale, ‘The Concept of “Due 
Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Rejoinder to 
John Ruggie and John Sherman’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 929, ft 9. 
31 Ruggie and Sherman, ‘Reply’ (n 29) 926. 
32 Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘Concept’ (n 24) 916. 
33 ibid. 
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important to human rights protection in the global economy. Corporate 
acts frequently ‘remove or reduce’ an individuals’ human rights in ways 
that cannot be captured by a system predicated on legal liability, in which 
negligence or ‘moral culpability’ must be proven. There is no necessary 
moral fault in an investment that increases rent prices and thereby 
endangers individuals’ right to housing, but it is an act that ‘reduces human 
rights enjoyment’. It is therefore an impact for which the company bears 
strict responsibility.
34
 This appears to be coherent with both sets of authors’ 
positions. It is, however, a long way from how impacts are popularly 
understood today. I review this understanding next. 
3.  The Contemporary Understanding: Impacts 
as Violations 
In this section I make two arguments: first, that the scope of ‘impacts’ is 
rarely explicated, particularly at intergovernmental and state level. Second, 
that it is generally assumed to be coterminous with ‘violations’, defined as 
legal or quasi-legal infractions of relational human rights standards. The 
term violation is itself frequently undefined, or inadequately defined, in 
the literature. I use the term ‘violation’ in the sense propounded by several 
BHR scholars, cited below, which depicts violation to mean a specific legal 
infraction, generally producing specified claimant victims that is, or should 
be, justiciable.
35
 This is narrower than the term violation as applied to state 
obligations,
36
 and much narrower than the scope of ‘impacts’. A few 
comparisons may help fully explicate the distinction. Labour rights 
violations such as non-payment of wages meet the criteria in that there is a 
specific legal breach producing a definitive victim, as would the unlawful 
destruction of individuals’ homes or the poisoning of individuals’ 
farmland. Acts by investors which increase house prices are legally 
permitted and, as they affect market prices, do not generally establish legal 
claims even where they ‘reduce rights enjoyment’.  
                                           
34 This specific example is used in the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate 
housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to 
non-discrimination in this context, ‘Financialization’ (n 9) [5], [25]-[27], [37]. 
35 See Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues 
Faced by an International Human Rights Organisation’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 
63, 73; Audrey Chapman, ‘A Violations Approach for Monitoring the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23, 
38. 
36 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart 
2009) 93-95.  




Deva provides the most complete textual analysis of ‘impacts’.
37
 In 
essence, he describes the term as I will, drawing attention to the ‘wider 
scope’ as compared to ‘violation’.
38
 Impacts, Deva argues, cover even 
harms that breach no legally framed human rights rules.
39
 Deva is however 
critical of the wider scope, arguing that is fosters indeterminacy and a 
relative lack of normative force.
40
 He goes on to argue that the term 
‘impact’ ‘shifts the focus from the breach of obligations implicit in the 
notion of ‘violation’ to companies merely affecting adversely the ability of 
a person to enjoy human rights’.
41
 This ‘devalue[s]’ human rights’.
42
 Deva 
defines violation as the ‘causation of legal injury to [an identified set of 
people] in terms of a breach of human rights’,
43
 and sees the prevention 
and remedy of such harm as at least the primary goal of BHR. In his 
analysis therefore, ‘impacts’ cover an expansive range of acts, but this is 
problematic because it moves away from the harder criteria of human 
rights violations. 
These arguments may be one reason why ‘impacts’ have been taken as 
largely coterminous with ‘violation’ today, used here in the sense defined 
by Deva, and similarly by Ramasastry as the breaching of ‘legal or quasi-
legal obligations’.
44
 McCorquodale et al. claim that ‘[t]he UNGPs do seem 
to establish that the ‘human rights impacts’ of companies should be 
interpreted in the same way as ‘human rights violations’’.
45
 However, the 
basis for this deduction is unclear. By way of explanation they write:  
 
While ‘human rights impacts’ is not defined in the GPs, it 
does seem to be equated there with human rights violations 
under international law. The Commentary on Principle 12 
makes clear that ‘business enterprises can have an impact on 
virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized 
human rights’, with the examples given of these rights being 
the major global human rights treaties and instruments.
46
 
                                           
37 Surya Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus Rhetoric and 
the Language Employed by the Guiding Principles’ in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), 
Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(CUP 2013) 78, 99. 
38 ibid 98. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid 97. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid 98. 
44 Anita Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: 
Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and Accountability’ (2015) 14 Journal of Human 
Rights 237, 240. 
45 McCorquodale and others, ‘Due Diligence’ (n 7) 199. 
46 ibid ft 18. 
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There is no positive basis to assume that the UNGPs equate impacts with 
violations under international law. First, while the UNGPs document does 
not define ‘impacts’, the OHCHR’s official guidance document, drafted 
‘in full collaboration’ with John Ruggie and designed to ‘provide additional 
background explanation to the Guiding Principles to support a full 
understanding of their meaning and intent’ does offer the definition 
supplied above.
47
 The authors do not state how they define ‘violation’, but 
if we accept the ‘causation of legal injury’ definition then ‘impacts’ seems 
significantly broader than ‘violations’. Very few experts would be 
comfortable with a definition of human rights violations as any act which 
‘removes or reduces the ability of an individual to enjoy his or her human 
rights’. Moreover, Ruggie himself is staunchly critical of the legalistic 
approach and has explicated that human rights law provides ‘the list’ of 
rights to be respected, but how they should be respected is unique to the 
UNGPs, with ‘impacts’ forming a central feature of that uniqueness.
48
  
However, it is true that in practice ‘impacts’ have been equated with 
‘violations’, as the authors show through an empirical survey of the 
business understanding of HRDD. Legal and regulatory compliance and 
reputational risk are the main factors driving the process.
49
 Legal and 
regulatory compliance suggest an understanding of impacts as coterminous 
with violations of at least the lex feranda as may be normatively enforced 
by voluntary regulation. This approach is popular among corporations 
because it both restricts the scope of their human rights responsibility and 
makes it relatively simple to manage.
50
 It also leads to what many have 
condemned as a ‘check-box’ approach to human rights responsibilities.
51
 
One typical example is the use of factory auditing to check for violations 
of specific human and labour rights abuses in supply chains.
52
 Reputational 
risk is potentially broader than regulatory compliance, though the authors 
offer no examples of what is considered a reputational risk. This fuzzier 
concept requires social norms promotive of expansive understandings of 
                                           
47 OHCHR, ‘Responsibility to Respect’ (n 8) 2-4. 
48  John Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (WW 
Norton & Company 2013) 96.  
49 McCorquodale and others, ‘Due Diligence’ (n 7) 201. 
50 Christian Scheper, ‘From Naming and Shaming to Knowing and Showing: Human 
Rights and the Power of Corporate Practice’ (2015) 19(6) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 737; Ciarán O’Kelly, ‘Human Rights and the Grammar of Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2019) Social and Legal Studies 1. 
51 Richard Locke, Matthew Amengual, and Akshay Mangla, ‘Virtue Out of Necessity? 
Compliance, Commitment, and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply 
Chains’ (2009) 37(3) Politics and Society 319, 327-29. 
52 Justine Nolan, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Challenge of Putting Principles into 
Practice and Regulating Global Supply Chains’ (2017) 42(1) Alternative Law Journal 42, 44. 




‘impacts’, and this has been lacking in the violations-centric discourse thus 
far. 
A paradigmatic case of assuming impacts mean legal violations is a 
2016 volume, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New 
Expectations and Paradigms.
53
 Many distinguished scholars contribute 
chapters, but primarily from the perspective of legal or regulatory 
compliance. Despite the term ‘human rights impacts’ being derived from 
the UNGPs, ‘impacts’ are taken to be legal infractions. In the words of one 
reviewer, ‘[t]he book focuses on the question of legal accountability of 
corporations for human rights violations.’
54
 There is therefore a radical 
problem with the book, in that many chapters assume that impacts and 
violations are one and same, and therefore treats the UNGPs as a weak 
interpretation of the law.
55
 The wording of impacts goes unconsidered, as 
does the potentially more expansive scope. 
There are numerous areas in which one could seek understandings of 
impacts. I will focus on National Action Plans (NAPs), documents drafted 
by states detailing their implementation of the UNGPs. The most obvious 
commonality among practical guidance documents is a lack of engagement 
with the meaning of the term ‘impacts’. The OHCHR guidance on NAPs 
provides no explanation of the term, despite defining NAPs as: ‘An 
evolving policy strategy developed by a State to protect against adverse 
human rights impacts by business enterprises.’
56
 The guidance explicates 
where potential impacts should be investigated, such as trade agreements, 
extraterritorial impacts, and investment agreements,
57
 but fails to define 
what constitutes an impact. State NAPs then follow suit, failing to define 
the term but implicitly viewing impacts as coterminous with violations. The 
updated UK NAP states that firms should ‘comply with all applicable laws 
and respect internationally recognized human rights [and] treat as a legal 
                                           
53  Lara Blecher, Nancy Kaymar Stafford, and Gretchen C. Bellamy (eds), Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New Expectations and Paradigms (ABA Book 
Publishing 2015). 
54  Judith Schrempf-Stirling, ‘Review of ‘Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights 
Impacts: New Expectations and Paradigms’ in Lara Blecher, Nancy Kaymar Stafford, and 
Gretchen C. Bellamy (eds), Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New 
Expectations and Paradigms (ABA Book Publishing 2015)’ (2016) 26 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 265, 265.  
55  Penelope Simons, ‘International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future Corporate 
Accountability for Violations of Human Rights’ in Lara Blecher, Nancy Kaymar Stafford, 
and Gretchen C. Bellamy (eds), Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New 
Expectations and Paradigms (ABA Book Publishing 2015).  
56 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Guidance on National Action 
Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (2016)  
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_NAPGuidance.pdf> 
accessed 24 June 2019. 
57 ibid 2, 26.  
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compliance issue the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights 
abuses wherever they operate’.
58
 The terminology is that of legal 
compliance, ‘gross abuses’, or else vague. There is no discussion of UK-
based business impacts on the right to food or health, of zero-hour 
contracts, of business links to rising use of food banks or domestic 
homelessness, and no discussion of the impacts of tax avoidance, despite 
British banks being heavily implicated in its global facilitation.
59
 For the UK 
government, ‘impacts’ mean legally-defined or ‘gross’ human rights 
violations, and this has not been challenged.  
This same narrow scope is being drafted into national laws. The 
French Duty of Vigilance Law, based on HRDD, states that all large 
companies must implement a vigilance plan. ‘The plan shall include the 
reasonable vigilance measures to allow for…the prevention of severe 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms...’
60
 The technique 
of HRDD is transposed into the law, but the expansiveness of impacts is 
specifically denied by the change in terminology. Differentiated scopes at 
binding and non-binding levels are reasonable, but a full understanding of 
the breadth of ‘impacts’ would encourage critique and evolving 
incremental expansions of what the French law could include. 
Finally, some posit an expansive understanding in seeking to capture 
specific harms as human rights impacts, of which climate change and, as 
described here, tax abuse, are the two most common. Tax abuse, the term 
adopted by Shane Darcy which encompasses both tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, is a major contemporary issue.
61
 The EU loses €60 billion a year;
62
 
the Democratic Republic of Congo lost double its combined annual health 
and education budget from a case of transfer mispricing.
63
 Asongu 
discusses Glencore’s transfer mispricing in Zambia, stating that in 2008: ‘if 
Zambia had received for its copper exports the same price that Switzerland 
                                           
58 HM UK Government, ‘Good Business Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights Updated May 2016’ (2016) Cm 9255 14. 
59 John Christensen, ‘Africa’s Bane: Tax Havens, Capital Flight and the Corruption 
Interface’ (2009) Elcano Working Paper 1, 17. 
60 Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau De Lomenie, ‘The French Law on 
Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2 
Business and Human Rights Journal 317, 320.  
61 Darcy (n 15) 2. 
62 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The desperate inequality behind global tax dodging’ The Guardian 
(London, 8 November 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/tax-havens-dodging-theft-
multinationals-avoiding-tax?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Gmail> accessed 23 July 2018. 
63 Isabel Mosselmans, ‘Tax Evasion: The Main Cause of Global Poverty’ (LSE Blogs, 7 
March 2014) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/03/07/tax-evasion-the-main-cause-of-
global-poverty/> accessed 23 July 2018. 








Because tax abuse is a major business-related issue, arguments have 
been made that it should be considered a human rights impact. UNSR on 
extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 
argues that tax avoiders would be in breach of the responsibility to respect, 
‘insofar as they have a negative human rights impact’.
65
 For Darcy, ‘[t]here 
is little doubt that negative human rights impacts can be linked to the 
abusive tax activities of accountancy, tax and law firms, banking and other 
financial services providers, as well as multinational and other companies 
that have knowingly engaged in tax avoidance.’
66
 With such arguments, the 
potential of the UNGPs ‘is beginning to be harnessed’.
67
 Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky, the UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt 
and other related international financial obligations of states on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural 
rights, states that:  
 
Business enterprises that contribute through transfer 
mispricing, tax evasion or corruption to significant illicit 
financial outflows cause adverse human rights impacts by 
undermining the abilities of States to progressively achieve 




Tax abuse uncovers the gap between the ‘violation’ and ‘impacts’ 
paradigm. Tax avoidance is like ‘taking food off the table for the poor’,
69
 
yet it is not widely-understood as a prima facie human rights violation.
70
 
Indeed, the act reduces state budgets and thereby potentially undermines 
state protection of rights, but technically it is the incapacitated state that 
may be at risk of violating rights through non-provision of essential 
services. This is the problem of the violations paradigm in contesting 
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global corporate economic activity and its potentially harmful impacts on 
rights. ‘Impacts’ overcomes this by encompassing all acts that ‘reduce’ 
rights enjoyment, including by contributing to that reduction. If a state 
claims that tax abuse has reduced its ability to ensure certain human rights 
provisions, this would constitute an authoritative argument that the act of 
tax abuse has contributed to reduced access to that right.
71
 This bypasses 
problems of establishing legal fault and finding claimant victims, while in 
so doing providing powerful human rights arguments against tax abuse.  
The meaning of ‘impacts’ is contested, and expansive understandings 
exist, but the most common understanding, particularly at the institutional 
level, connects impacts to legal infractions. To build the more expansive 
argument, I first review how Ruggie perceives corporate responsibility, his 
underlying framework, and his priorities for the UNGPs. 
4. Reading Ruggie 
Ruggie has two major epistemic frameworks that informed the UNGPs. 
He believes in a post-Westphalian, polycentric world that is organized 
through the ‘global public domain’ comprised of states, businesses, 
activists and other important actors.
72
 This angle has been extensively 
discussed through the lens of polycentric governance.
73
 His second belief 
is more normative. This is grounded in his concept of embedded 
liberalism and focuses on making markets and market actors work in the 
social interest. While polycentricity critiques reliance on hard law and 
state-based regulation, embedded liberalism can be used to critique 
legalistic human rights concerns. Reifying this latter aspect counters the 
view that the UNGPs are merely soft law;
74
 rather, they are soft to allow 
greater ambition than could legalistically-framed principles.   
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Many scholars have analysed Ruggie’s interim reports to the UN 
during the UNGPs drafting process. However, these reports are technical 
and descriptive in nature and give little away regarding the philosophy 
underlying them. For example, in the 2008 report Ruggie ‘focused on 
identifying the distinctive responsibilities of companies in relation to 
human rights’,
75
 but Ruggie did not provide a conceptual framework to 
explain how these choices were made. Ruggie admits as much in noting 
his own ‘failure to provide a robust moral theory’.
76
 His ‘principled 
pragmatism’ forbade such an option, since UN Human Rights Council 
approval was necessary.
77
 He therefore focused on creating a document 
that was ‘pushing the envelope, but not out of reach’.
78
 This is part of what 
Mares has termed Ruggie’s ‘strategic ambiguity’,
79
 in which the UNGPs 
state few concrete implications for business but rather offer a framework 
encouraging norm-evolution. Although it is not my intention to surmise 
Ruggie’s personal, unstated, concerns, it is worth addressing his own 
academic background for a hint as to his normative priorities.  
Ruggie’s most telling contribution to academia is the concept of 
embedded liberalism.
80
 This states that in the period roughly from the end 
of WWII until the neoliberal era emerged around the 1980s, the world 
trade system was characterized by a ‘grand bargain’ between trade 
liberalization and domestic social policy.
81
 Serious diversions from free 
trade were permitted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which allowed domestic economies to be managed in the social 
interest.
82
 In Ruggie’s words ‘economic liberalization was embedded in 
social community.’
83
 Elsewhere he describes this as a ‘domestic social 
compact. Governments asked their publics to embrace the change and 
dislocation that comes with liberalization in return for help in containing 
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and socializing the adjustment costs.’
84
 The neoliberal era ruptured this, 
characterized most clearly by the redefinition of a trade barrier to include 
‘behind the border’ barriers such as subsidies and environmental policies.
85
 
This change allowed experts comprising the free trade regime to critique 
almost every state policy on the grounds of it disrupting trade. The 
tuna/dolphin cases between the US and Mexico, each predicated on the 
legality under World Trade Organization rules of the US prescribing that 
all tuna sold in the US must be ‘dolphin-safe’, is one example of this 
tendency.
86
 This instigated a much more radical, interventionist, and less 
socially-protective free trade system.
87
  
Ruggie’s academic work is frequently underpinned by his belief that 
globalization has broken down this domestic social compact, and that there 
is a need to globalize a grand bargain between market actors and society.
88
 
‘What is needed…is a new embedded liberalism compromise, a new 
formula for combining the twin desires of international and domestic 
stability’,
89
 he wrote in 1999. In 2001, he was instrumental in developing 
the UN Global Compact, a voluntary initiative that corporations could join 
pledging to obey nine, later ten, key principles of responsible business.
90
 
In 2008, he stated that ‘[e]mbedding the global market within shared social 
values and institutional practices represents a task of historic magnitude’,
91
 
and elaborated concerns about inequality, the imbalance in global 
rulemaking powers, and growing ‘economic instability and social 
dislocation’.
92
 At the 2016, UN Forum on Business and Human Rights he 
argued that exploitative economic structures were linked to ‘populist 
forces [that] involve people who have been left behind by the liberalization 
and technological innovations.’
93
 A 2017 paper dealt with variants of 
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corporate power over society and claimed that neither BHR nor 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) discourse truly grasps the depth of 
this power.
94
 Ruggie’s view of human rights is also more holistic than 
legalistic. Following Sen, he argues that human rights are not just rules, but 
‘mediators of social relations’.
95
 They emerge from society and 
understandings of their scope and content evolve through society.
96
 
Human rights can be expressed as laws, but should also provide a vehicle 
for social progress through ‘public discussion’.
97
 For Sen, human rights 
should evolve with society and can offer far more than just legal guarantees 
against oppression.
98
 This element is particularly important for the idea 
that ‘impacts’ provide an argumentative framework through which claims 
can be made for types of harm not often considered within the scope of 
business responsibility, as described in Section 6. 
Given Ruggie’s long-held belief in the virtues of embedded liberalism, 
and his extensive writings on the need for a comprehensive social compact 
between markets and societies,
99
 it seems plausible that such ideas would 
be evident in the UNGPs.
100
 Such a compact must go beyond preventing 
human rights violations (as legal infractions), because such a depiction only 
covers a small slither of this bargain, particularly in the socio-economic 
sphere. One cannot argue that an adequate social compact is in place if 
corporations are permitted to practice tax abuse, retrogress the right to 
housing, distort global food markets and damage the environment.  
Ruggie drew on Iris Marion Young to build such a model.
101
 Young 
describes her model as a supplement to the failures of theories of justice 
grounded in individual (legalistic) liability to address structural forms of 
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 Young builds expansive societal responsibilities for structuralized 
harms based on the argument that through global economic activity 
multiple groups contribute to, and can help prevent, injustice. She frames 
one argument around the responsibility felt by student consumers of 
sweatshop clothing.
103
 Ruggie drew from Young’s work that ‘challenges 
arising from globalization are structural in character [and] cannot be 
resolved by an individual liability model of responsibility alone.’
104
 The 
most paradigmatic definition states that: ‘[t]he “social connection model” 
of responsibility says that all agents who contribute by their actions to the 
structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to 
remedy these injustices.’
105
 ‘Impacts’ is similarly comprehensive in stating 
that businesses have responsibility for any act that causes or contributes to 
a removal or reduction in an individuals’ human rights enjoyment. As I 
show next, this allows arguments to be constructed around a far wider 
range of harmful business acts, and, properly understood, allows for a 
significant departure from the limits of individual liability, and towards 
Young’s more expansive conception.  
5. Re-Reading Impacts 
‘An “adverse human rights impact” occurs when an action removes or 
reduces the ability of an individual to enjoy his or her human rights.’
106
 
Firms have strict responsibility to prevent, mitigate and/or remediate all 
adverse impacts that they have caused or contributed to, at least, as well as 
responsibility to investigate potential impacts. Breaking this term down 
reveals its expansiveness. 
Four areas will be highlighted: the meaning of ‘an action’; of ‘remove 
or reduce’; and of ‘an individual’; as well as the role of ‘potential impacts’. 
My reading of impacts is as follows: corporations should investigate 
whether any of their acts, whether in the boardroom or on the factory 
floor, might potentially, through violation, retrogression or other means, 
harm any right of any individual, anywhere.
 107
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The term ‘an action’ relates to how corporations might harm rights. 
‘An action’ by its plain-meaning, means that any act is covered, with the 
judgement criterion being the ‘removal or reduction’ of human rights 
enjoyment. This is far more inclusive than understandings incorporating 
only acts that breach ‘legal or quasi-legal rules’.
108
 This has a prima facie 
link to tort law in that tort claims can in theory cover any action based on 
the harm caused, providing the other elements of tort law are also met. 
However, ‘impacts’ also goes far beyond the scope of tort law. Impacts 
requires neither that the act breached a legal rule nor that proximity or 
other tort principles be found, nor is it, like strict liability torts, restricted 
to a narrow scope of harms based on inherent danger and/or a high level 
of duty of care, as per product liability. ‘Impacts’ explicitly encompass any 
act that leads to the outcome of any ‘removal or reduction’ of rights’ 
enjoyment. 
This wide, extra-legal scope is clear from some examples in the official 
guidance. The OHCHR lists one contributory impact as ‘[t]argeting high-
sugar foods and drinks at children, with an impact on childhood obesity’.
109
 
This is neither a criminal nor tortious legal breach in any jurisdiction in 
the world, albeit regulations on advertising and product standards may 
exist. It is a human rights impact regardless of any regulations based solely 
on the outcome of increased child obesity. John Ruggie has more recently 
argued that bank lending can constitute a contributory human rights 
impact where that loan has ‘enabled’ the impact by the recipient.
110
 These 
examples teach a great deal about the scope of impacts, particularly when 
read alongside the notion of ‘strict responsibility’. The fundamental rule 
underlying ‘impacts’ is outcome-based.
111
 Any act which causes or 
contributes to the outcome of a removal or reduction in an individual’s 
rights constitutes an adverse impact. This means that all acts by business 
enterprises are within the scope of impacts if they remove or reduce rights’ 
enjoyment. There is therefore no prima facie exclusion of investment 
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firms, housing developers, or the facilitators of tax abuse; a boardroom 
choice with repercussive impacts on a human right is just as relevant to the 
framework as a direct violation such as a boss not paying a worker. The 
impact is the only relevant factor.  
This then makes the term ‘removes or reduces’ rights enjoyment the 
crucial element. While the ‘removal’ of an individual’s rights enjoyment 
suggests its complete violation (i.e. the destruction of a home or instigation 
of torture), the term ‘reduce’ expands the scope beyond the 
compliance/violation legal paradigm. The term ‘reduce’, which is 
uncommon in legal or other rights discourse, is likely designed to 
encompass a wider range of harm to rights, most obviously, in the language 
of human rights law, ‘retrogressions’ of rights, without using legal language 
that may have perturbed states. The term ‘reduce’ is similar to ‘retrogress’ 
in that both are quantitative terms. ‘Reduce’ means to ‘make less in 
amount’,
112
 while ‘retrogression’ is defined as a ‘de facto, empirical 
backsliding in the effective enjoyment of rights’,
113
 for example, a reduction 
in the availability of food. Under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) state parties undertaking 
‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ are in violation of the Covenant 
unless the measure is necessary to protect the totality of rights.
114
 This 
includes any law, policy or act that has the effect of quantitatively reducing 
access to the right. 
115
 In the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (CESCR) Concluding Observations on Egypt, budget cuts to 
health, education and housing, as well as ‘increasing recourse to regressive 
indirect taxation’ were considered to constitute retrogressive measures 
based on the harmful outcomes for the rights in question.
116
 This may be 
defined as a violation of Egypt’s obligations, but such retrogressive acts are 
rarely seen as violations by business actors.  
The ‘impacts’ framework thereby shifts corporate responsibility closer 
to the more comprehensive state obligations. The purpose of the term 
retrogression is to capture that the macro-level backsliding of the 
availability of material rights is as harmful to rights as traditional legal 
breaches. ‘Impacts’, by covering acts which ‘reduce the ability of an 
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individual to enjoy his or her human rights’, must include any business 
practices that retrogress access to human rights. Encompassing 
retrogressive acts renders the ‘impacts’ framework particularly expansive 
and far beyond legal practice as applied to corporations. The example 
above of increasing house and rental prices caused by investment 
companies constitutes a retrogression in the affordability of housing. It is 
not a legal breach under any domestic law and it is not a tortious wrong.
117
 
It is, however, a human rights impact insofar as it is reducing individuals’ 
access to affordable housing, one of the seven core criteria of the right.  
One possible counterargument is that under the UNGPs firms do not 
have positive responsibilities to realize human rights. An impact can only 
be negative. Therefore, it may be claimed that housing investments are 
positive actions engendering no responsibilities. A company that was 
providing housing, food or healthcare and is now providing less or a less 
affordable version, has merely reduced its contribution to the fulfillment 
of rights. However, this is not the way impacts is framed. A business act 
that causes any kind of reduction constitutes an impact. Such adverse 
impacts should best be seen as ‘active negative’ responsibilities. An active 
negative responsibility is one in which the prevention of harm requires 
taking a positive action, and as such it remains part of the ‘respect’ pillar.
118
 
Ruggie has mentioned active negative responsibilities such as 
implementing a workplace anti-discrimination policy to ensure non-
discrimination,
119
 and health and safety policies have similar active 
components. The essence of ‘impact’ is the harm the act caused. At least 
where corporations have significant power over provision of a right, active 
negative responsibilities will be necessary to prevent adverse impacts. As 
the retrogression of affordable housing constitutes an adverse impact it 
requires that companies involved in housing take steps to prevent, mitigate 
and remedy the impact. It is reasonable that debates take place around the 
precise limits of this responsibility, as the grounding in ‘social norms’ 
encourages, but the wording of ‘impacts’ creates a paradigm capable of 
capturing such harmful acts.  
The third aspect related to the precise terminology is that it applies to 
‘an individual to enjoy his or her human rights’. We have already captured 
any act, and any form of harm. This completes the triad by reinforcing that 
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it applies to anyone, anywhere, thus clarifying the global scope of impacts. 
An adverse impact occurs if any individual, anywhere, is harmed. It does 
not matter what kind of relationship the ‘victim’ has with the corporation, 
nor how distant the harm may be. As Ruggie has argued in a critique of 
the ‘sphere of influence’ depiction of responsibility, corporate impacts 
ripple around the world, affecting individuals far removed from the source 
of the issue.
120
 It means that managers must consider globally repercussive 
impacts. This is bolstered by one criterion of ‘severe’ impacts being the 
‘scope’, that is, the number of people harmed.
121
 Such a concept is alluded 
to in Ruggie’s critique of the Thun Group’s paper, which stated plainly that 
banks should lend with the repercussions of those lending choices in 
mind.
122
 Even though the banks may never know the specific individuals 
that might be harmed by a specific project, they should consider how their 
lending may contribute to an impact.
123
   
This allows an expanded look at how rights are being impacted in the 
global economy, and provides an argumentative basis for those who have 
identified a particular practice as harmful to their rights. It is not, in my 
view, an example of ‘rights inflation’, such that this dilutes the strength of 
human rights claims.
124
 Rather, it centres the rights-holder and takes 
seriously the fact that human rights are being impacted through actions 
within the global economy in a litany of ways. Since businesses can cause 
harm in near infinite and evolving ways, the framework does not create a 
closed list of obligations (as is Ruggie’s fear around a binding treaty),
125
 but 
rather adopts an inclusive definition of what constitutes relevant harm. 
This is important because many forms of harm to human rights by private 
actors are not legal breaches and are economic in nature. The 
financialization of housing is a good example because it comprises a long 
list of corporate acts, all of which are legally-permitted, which vary by 
jurisdiction, and for which the same act taking place in different contexts 
may cause varying levels of harm, or even none at all. ‘Impacts’ centres the 
harmful outcome on rights-holders. If certain practices under the umbrella 
of financialization are causing harm in a particular location, this harm can 
be challenged. As such it centres the right to housing, rather than a set of 
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preconceived rules within which gaps will inevitably appear. This is crucial 
if human rights are to be protected from harm by global economic actors. 
Finally, ‘potential impacts’ reverse the demand for proof. Under the 
impacts framework, the victim does not have to show that a specific firm 
committed a specific violation, but rather corporations must identify their 
own potential impacts, including by drawing on outside expertise.
126
 This 
reverses the logic of legalism, from setting stringent demands on the victim: 
‘can you show legal liability of a specific firm?’ to the company: ‘will this 
act adversely impact anyone’s human rights anywhere?’ Combined with 
the above, corporations should proactively identify whether any of their 
acts will reduce the rights of anyone, anywhere. By placing the onus on the 
outcome of corporate acts, rather than individual legal liability, ‘impacts’ 
greatly expand the scope of responsibility.   
There is one crucially important final aspect to be discussed. The 
‘impacts’ framework is not legally binding. Firms should prevent and 
remedy all adverse impacts, but they are not bound to do so. This 
ostensible weakness is in reality a product of the transformative scope of 
‘impacts’. As a binding legal standard it would be too onerous. As a social 
standard, as I show next, it provides a way of understanding BHR impacts 
and an argumentative framework in which affected groups can voice 
concerns, ultimately offering a contestatory logic for those who suffer not 
from human rights violations, but under the heaving body of adverse 
impacts stemming from the global economy.  
 
 
6. Impacts as an Argumentative Framework 
 
The ‘impacts’ framework sets prohibitive limits to business activity. Losing 
one’s job may reduce one’s ability to enjoy human rights, as may a ban 
from a social media platform. Some impacts are very minor, some may 
never be known, and some are necessary to balance interests, yet all are 
included as impacts. However, there are some defined and some de facto 
limits. In the former category are severity and salience, both of which are 
prioritization strategies, rather than limits on the scope, though they will 
play a role in limiting what firms will address in practice. Severity is judged 
on ‘scale’ (seriousness), ‘scope’ (extent), and ‘irremediability’ (how difficult 
the harm would be to remedy).
127
 ‘Salient human rights issues’, refer to 
those most likely to occur within a specific corporate operation.
128
 The 
most salient issues ‘will likely need to be the subject of the most 
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systematized and regular attention.’
129
 In the latter category, are the 
‘socially-binding’ status of the UNGPs and the idea that firms should 
‘know and show’ their own impacts. Firms are not legally required to 
undertake HRDD or consider their impacts beyond that enforced by 
applicable law, rather, the ‘responsibility is based in a social norm’,
130
 
defined as ‘shared expectations of how particular actors are to conduct 
themselves in given circumstances.’
131
 The real quality of impacts is in 
providing an authoritative argumentative framework within which social 
norms against corporate behaviours can develop. There is little need to 
worry that empowered calls of ‘human rights impact’ will meet every 
redundancy. What the framework provides is a way to both understand 
and contest corporate impacts.  
The social grounding has been heavily criticized. Wettstein states the 
UNGPs ‘appeal to interests rather than to morality’.
132
 Cragg agrees that the 
‘justificatory foundation of the report is enlightened self-interest’, and is 
based on the unpredictable social reaction to a human rights issue.
133
 A 
basing in social costs favours ‘those stakeholders with the largest impact on 
the company’s bottom line’.
134
 This is ‘the ethic of instrumentalism’, that 
‘reasserts, rather than relativizes, the primacy of profits and shareholder 
value’.
135
 ‘While instrumental reasoning is geared to cater to the powerful, 
the very purpose of human rights is to protect the powerless.’
136
 
The authors take the social as synonymous with the business case for 
human rights, which states that respecting rights improves the firm’s 
reputation and mitigates serious risks, thereby making business sense.
137
 
This does encourage an instrumental approach favouring the concerns of 
powerful stakeholders. However, this is a limited view of Ruggie’s 
constructivist conceptualization of social norms. Social constructivism 
claims that the social reality we inhabit is largely socially constructed ‘by 
the means of commonly shared, intersubjective knowledge.’
138
 Therefore, 
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when Ruggie discusses ‘social norms’ he is not referring to business case 
instrumentalism, but rather to the norms of society at large. In each society 
there are harmful acts that businesses are prohibited (legally or socially) 
from undertaking, and harmful acts that generate minimal pushback. One 
key norm in need of elaboration is therefore which business acts that cause 
harm to human rights count as BHR issues. For the constructivist, this is 
an important and relatively indeterminate question.
139
 Such norms are 
always evolving, with what constitutes discrimination being one case-in-
point.
140
 Issues like tax avoidance can become relevant with enough social 
pressure, but this will only occur through gradual acculturation.
141
 
Building intersubjective knowledge around the human rights harm 
resulting from such acts encourages a shift in the social understanding of 
BHR, and can therefore lead to powerful evolutions in rights discourse, 
capable, in time, of informing law. In this constructivist vein, ‘impacts’ 
should therefore be seen primarily as an argumentative framework 
through which social actors – from small community groups to global 
activists or politicians – can translate the harms of global business into 
human rights concerns. Sen argues that ‘survival in open public discussion’ 
is crucial for any rights-claim.
142
 This is a limiting factor, but also a liberating 
factor from the specific technical boundaries of the legal approach. Not 
every claim will succeed, but as intersubjective knowledge evolves through 
this framework, the legitimacy of such claims should increase. As such, the 
socially-grounded ‘impacts’ framework provides a vital supplement to 
binding but inevitably more minimal legal frameworks.
143
  
HRDD and firms ‘knowing and showing’ their own impacts assists in 
the creation of this knowledge.
144
 While the basic rule is that all impacts 
should be prevented and/or remediated, there will be debates around what 
constitutes an impact, and companies will deny some alleged impacts. But 
it is more difficult for managers to argue that they should not at least 
investigate possible impacts. If claims are made that the actions of firm X 
are adversely impacting right Y, any firm concerned with its reputation, at 
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least, should be motivated to investigate. If human rights impacts are then 
discovered, much stronger arguments can be made that they should be 
addressed. Although HRDD and ‘know and show’ applies to companies, 
it also creates incentives for others to investigate business impacts. This 
increases the knowledge of potential impacts that is a prerequisite for 
ethical business. 
Finally, impacts reify a truth marginalized by legalism: that social 
problems are human rights problems. It is difficult to imagine a socially 
unpopular business act that definitively has no human rights impacts, yet 
many such issues are rarely discussed in human rights terms. In so doing, 
some groups feel under-represented in rights discourses, as Alston 
discusses around rising populism.
145
 Drawing these links can ensure rights 
are respected in our increasingly corporatized and interconnected world, 
and ‘impacts’ provides the means to do so.  
 
 
7. ‘Impacts’ as a Lens on Structural Harm, 
Corporate Power, and Socio-Economic 
Justice 
 
In this section I want to briefly clarify the transformative potential of 
‘impacts’. I propose three areas occluded by a violations approach but 
captured by impacts: structural harm, corporate power, and socio-
economic justice.  
A focus on violations occludes structural harm. Linklater defines 
structural harm as harm rooted in ‘systemic forces’,
146
 and is critical of those 
‘who would claim so little [as constituting harm that they sought only to 
prevent] harming each other in the course of their interactions.’
147
 This 
interactional view of harm equates to the violations approach rooted in 
legal accountability, where acts must provably harm specific individuals. 
Even structural harm, however, is still ultimately traced to human agency.
148
 
Housing crises, climate change, the 2008 global food crisis and many other 
possible examples, are structural in nature (the latter defined by sudden 
failure of the global food system to provide adequate food), yet the causes 
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can be traced to specific acts by states and corporations.
149
 Calls for 
structural change are in reality calls for individual duty bearers to take 
responsibility, and ‘impacts’ captures the business side of this. It captures, 
therefore, those problems too often dismissed, as in the UN Working 
Group (UNWG) report on access to remedy, as requiring ‘fundamental 
changes in social, political or economic structures’ and therefore beyond 
the scope of accountability.
150
  
Structural harm matters because of corporate power over rights, states 
and societies.
151
 McKinsey puts total global corporate profits at $7.2 trillion, 
just under 10% of total global GDP.
152
 Complex, corporate-managed, 
systems dictate the availability of many material rights, while corporate 
wealth exerts major pressures on other actors, not least states. This power 
leads to the wide gamut of potential harm beyond violations. Corporations 
can instrumentalize power resources in harmful ways (e.g. by lobbying 
states), can exercise power over structures in harmful ways (e.g. housing), 
and can impact individuals directly such as through employment 
practices.
153
 Such power can cause harmful outcomes for individuals’ 
human rights. This invokes difficult questions of responsibility at the 
margins that require further research, but when the instrumentalization of 
power resources causes discernible harm to a human right,
154
 they 
constitute prima facie adverse impacts. Research into impacts should look 
at specific lobbying practices, for example, to identify whether and how 
they adversely impact rights.  
By covering acts that ‘reduce’ rights enjoyment, harms to socio-
economic justice are captured, including retrogressions even from 
relatively high starting points. This is a major advance in a world where 
socio-economic rights are often theoretically realisable, but are vulnerable 
to systemic issues, including corporate policies. The risks inherent in 
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financialized housing, commodified food, and through tax abuse have 
been cited in this area. In these sectors, business acts are reducing human 
rights enjoyment, but human rights law has been tentative in addressing 
the issues, with some arguing that it may go beyond the legitimate scope of 
human rights.
155
 While herein I have advocated for the broad approach, 
the latter does have advantages in terms of enforceability. Nonetheless, the 
quality of the social norm approach is in providing a framework through 
which the more ambitious cases can be made linking the business act and 
the resultant adverse impact. This provides a fresh lens on the major socio-
economic problems of our time, and a powerful weapon for those 
suffering from such acts.  
The next stage in understanding impacts must be research into specific 
impacts. Corporations are potentially adversely impacting rights in a 
plethora of ways in every society. Empirical work is needed around each 
specific right and around multiple corporate practices. Concurrently, 
affected citizens need to understand that the social problems associated 
with corporate activity can be contested based on their human rights 
impacts. At the theoretical level, full engagement with the text of the 
impacts framework from human rights scholars would assist in 
understanding the scope and limits of the social responsibilities of business 





Corporations hold a strict responsibility to prevent and/or remedy all 
adverse human rights impacts which they cause or to which they 
contribute. ‘Impacts’ go far beyond ‘violations’ to cover any act that 
removes or reduces an individual’s enjoyment of human rights. As such, 
the framework is rightly understood as having an expansive scope that is 
of particular use where corporations have power within rights-relevant 
global markets and to address the corporate role in structural issues such 
as the global food crisis. This scope is however only socially-binding and 
therefore requires social norms and expertise promotive of this broader 
understanding, particularly in popular discourse. It is submitted that this is 
Ruggie’s under-explored contribution to the BHR debate: the creation of 
an argumentative framework for social actors to use that can capture all 
business-related harm to rights, and that in so doing offers a platform that 
can transform the business-society relationship. 
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